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HOT OFF THE PRESS: AN ARGUMENT FOR A
FEDERAL SHIELD LAW AFFORDING A
QUALIFIED EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE TO
JOURNALISTS IN LIGHT OF RENEWED
CONCERNS ABOUT FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Nicole N. Wentworth*
I. INTRODUCTION
Journalists who are forced to choose between revealing a source
or maintaining confidences face very real consequences for their
decision. Reporters have spent time in jail, been released of
confidentiality from their sources to avoid jail time, or paid fines for
refusing to reveal sources.1 For example, Judith Miller, a reporter for
the New York Times, controversially spent eighty-five days in jail for
refusing to reveal her source after being subpoenaed.2 More recently,
James Risen, also a reporter for the New York Times, appealed to the
Supreme Court after he was subpoenaed to testify about the identity
of his confidential source.3 Although his appeal was denied,

* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science and
Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, June 2016. The author would like to thank the
wonderful Professor Gary C. Williams, Professor of Evidence, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles,
and the amazing Megan Wilson for their support and encouragement.
1. See, e.g., A Look at the Last Nine US Reporters Who Faced the Possibility of Jail Time,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (July/Aug. 2014), https://archives.cjr.org/opening_shot/
opening_shot_july_august_2014.php; Journalists Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Identify
Confidential Sources, as of 2019, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS,
https://www.rcfp.org/jailed-fined-journalists-confidential-sources/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
2. Journalists Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Identify Confidential Sources, as of 2019, supra
note 1. Miller never published an article based on her source’s information, but she was subpoenaed
to testify before a federal grand jury investigating a leak naming a CIA officer. She was released
when her source waived confidentiality and she subsequently agreed to testify. The ordeal became
colloquially deemed, “The Plame Affair.” Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, NPR
(July 2, 2007, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4764919.
3. Federal prosecutors subpoenaed Risen to name the CIA agent who was a source for his
book investigating CIA activities in Iran. Matt Apuzzo, Times Reporter Will Not Be Called to
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prosecutors ultimately did not force Risen to choose between
identifying his source or facing jail time.4 Most journalists facing these
circumstances have stressed the importance of maintaining
confidentiality to do their jobs, and have said they are willing to face
jail time rather than reveal a confidential source.5 Concern about an
evidentiary privilege for journalists seems to reemerge into the public
discourse whenever a prominent journalist is facing jail time in
contempt of court for refusing to reveal a source.
Recently, the relationship between the Trump administration and
the press has sparked a renewed debate about a federal shield law.6 In
particular, President Trump’s response to an anonymous op-ed essay
published in the New York Times reignited fear for the freedom of the
press in the United States.7 Trump called the op-ed, which criticized
him and described a “resistance” within the White House, an act of
treason.8 Trump subsequently suggested the identity of the source
Testify in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/us/timesreporter-james-risen-will-not-be-called-to-testify-in-leak-case-lawyers-say.html.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Gordon T. Belt, Jailed & Subpoenaed Journalists—A Historical Timeline,
FREEDOM F. INST., https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Jailedsubpoenaed-timeline1.pdf (last updated Feb. 2010).
6. See, e.g., Paul Fletcher, Sessions’ Testimony Prompts New Federal Shield Law Bill
Protecting Journalists, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2017, 8:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
paulfletcher/2017/11/29/sessions-testimony-prompts-new-federal-shield-law-bill-protectingjournalists/#1a4fe1384912; Margot Harris, Is It Finally Time For A Federal Shield Law?, NEWS
MEDIA ALL. (July 27, 2018), https://www.newsmediaalliance.org/fed-shield-law-2018; Jonathan
Peters, The Time Is Right for the Journalist Protection Act. But We Need
a Federal Shield Law, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/united_
states_project/journalist-protection-act.php.
7. The New York Times noted that publishing an op-ed anonymously is a “rare step.” I Am
Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-resistance.html.
Previously, the New York Times had only published a few anonymously written op-ed pieces,
usually due to safety reasons. See, e.g., Anonymous, What My 6-Year-Old Son and I Endured in
Family Detention, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/opinion/
family-detention-immigration.html (written anonymously because of gang-related threats);
Marwan Hisham, Living Beneath the Banner of ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/opinion/living-under-the-sword-of-isis-in-syria.html
(written under a pen name to protect the author from being targeted by the Islamic State); Laila, A
Syrian Refugee’s Message to the European Union, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/opinion/a-syrian-refugees-message-to-the-europeanunion.html (written by a Syrian refugee in Greece using her first name because her family in Syria
faced threats); Shane M., A Different Iranian Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/opinion/19shane.html (written by a student in Iran who was
identified only by his first name).
8. Michael M. Grynbaum, Anonymous Op-Ed in New York Times Causes a Stir Online and
in the White House, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018),
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should be investigated as an issue of national security.9 Although the
Trump administration never formally launched an investigation into
the identity of the author of the op-ed,10 Trump’s comments on the
matter, in combination with his overall attitude towards the press, have
caused an uproar among journalists and First Amendment proponents.
Specifically, Trump’s comments have raised concerns about the
appropriate balance between national security concerns and the
freedom of the press. Trump’s attempts to address “leaks” from the
White House have enflamed these concerns, as his actions
demonstrate a willingness to pursue journalists and the identities of
their sources. According to James Comey, the FBI director at the time,
when Comey suggested the need to “make an example” of a journalist
to dispel further leaks, Trump replied that journalists would be willing
to reveal their sources after being jailed.11
While Trump has been blamed for a recent decline in the United
States’ press freedom,12 the United States has never been well known
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/business/media/new-york-times-trump-anonymous.html;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 5, 2018, 3:15 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1037464177269514240.
9. Mark Landler & Katie Benner, Trump Wants Attorney General to Investigate Source of
Anonymous Times Op-Ed, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/us/
politics/trump-investigation-times-op-ed.html (“I would say Jeff [Sessions] should be investigating
who the author of that piece was because I really believe it’s national security.”); see also Donald
J.
Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER
(Sept. 5,
2018,
4:40
PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1037485664433070080 (“Does the so-called ‘Senior
Administration Official’ really exist, or is it just the Failing New York Times with another phony
source? If the GUTLESS anonymous person does indeed exist, the Times must, for National
Security purposes, turn him/her over to government at once!”).
10. See, e.g., Associated Press, Still Anonymous: White House Hunt for Op-Ed Author Fades,
CNBC (Oct. 6, 2018, 8:10 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/05/still-anonymous-white-househunt-for-op-ed-author-fades.html. New York Times op-ed editor Jim Dao has expressed his doubt
that the New York Times would be forced to reveal its source even with an investigation as
“absolutely nothing in the Op-Ed involves criminal behavior.” How the Anonymous Op-Ed Came
to Be, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/reader-center/
anonymous-op-ed-trump.html.
11. Memorandum from James Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4442900-Ex-FBI-Director-James-Comey-smemos.html (“[Trump] replied by saying it may involve putting reporters in jail. ‘They spend a
couple days in jail, make a new friend, and they are ready to talk.’”).
12. 2019 World Press Freedom Index, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS,
https://rsf.org/en/ranking (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). Reporters Without Borders primarily blames
Trump for the fall in the United States’ ranking from forty-one in 2016 to forty-five in 2018, citing
his verbal attacks toward journalists, calling the press an enemy of the American people, attempting
to block White House access from media outlets, and using “fake news” in retaliation for negative
reporting. Notably, Reporters Without Borders also comments on the United States’ lack of a
federal shield law. Trump Exacerbates Press Freedom’s Steady Decline, REPORTERS WITHOUT
BORDERS (2018), https://rsf.org/en/united-states.
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for its respect for the freedom of the press. Presidents have routinely
used concerns about national security as a means to control the press.
For example, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the
Bush administration encouraged agencies to remove documents and
data from their websites,13 limited access to the records of former
presidents,14 and limited access to records requests made by any
foreign government or international government organization.15
Despite championing free access to information as part of his
campaign, the Obama administration prosecuted more “leakers” under
the Espionage Act than any former administration following
unauthorized disclosures that the Obama administration insisted
revealed state secrets.16
But the tensions between the press and the government go back
even further than that. For example, in a much-publicized speech
before the American Newspaper Publishers Association, President
Kennedy explained that recent news articles had hurt national security
by exposing details about covert operations of the United States
government, and he urged self-censorship of the press.17 As tensions
between the government and the press increased in the 1960s and
1970s, the argument for an evidentiary privilege for journalists first
gained popular attention. As anti-war and more radical activist groups
formed in response to the Vietnam War, journalism became a
powerful tool for spreading alternative viewpoints during a time when
people were growing increasingly disillusioned with the

13. Adam Clyner, Government Openness at Issue as Bush Holds on to Records, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 3, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/03/us/government-openness-at-issue-as-bushholds-on-to-records.html.
14. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001). The order was later revoked
by President Obama. Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,669 (Jan. 21, 2009).
15. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, § 312, 116 Stat. 2383
(2002).
16. Jason Ross Arnold, Has Obama Delivered the ‘Most Transparent’ Administration in
History?, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/16/has-obama-delivered-the-most-transparent-administration-inhistory/ (“Although the increase may have resulted partly from the discrete decisions of prosecutors
as well as improved detection technologies, it also results from the choices of senior officials to
prosecute leakers under a law targeting spies.”).
17. John F. Kennedy, U.S. President, Address Before the American Newspaper Publishers
Association: The President and the Press (Apr. 27, 1961), in JOHN F. KENNEDY, PUBLIC PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY: 1961 153 (Warren R. Reid ed.,
1961) (“Every newspaper now asks itself, with respect to every story: ‘Is it news?’ All I suggest is
that you add the question: ‘Is it in the interest of national security?’”).
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government.18 Unfortunately, many of these journalists were
subpoenaed by prosecutors and law enforcement officials to reveal
their sources and confidential information.19 The tensions between the
press and the government rose, resulting in a huge increase in
subpoenas issued to journalists.20 The media began to claim that the
government was silencing criticism by suppressing unfavorable
commentary and manipulating the press.21 In response, journalists
began to make claims of privilege.22 These claims resulted in various
appeals by the government and the media alike to the Supreme Court,
culminating in the Court’s first and only decision on whether the First
Amendment might afford journalists with an evidentiary privilege.23
Oftentimes, sources will not give information to journalists for
public access without an assurance that the source will be kept
confidential. The Supreme Court has rejected the contention that the
First Amendment affords any such evidentiary privileges to journalists
facing a grand jury subpoena, and the lower courts have since taken
different approaches in criminal cases confronting claims of
journalistic privilege.24 This Note will argue that Congress must pass
a federal shield law affording journalists a qualified evidentiary
privilege in order to resolve the differences among the lower courts
and to ensure the freedom of the press while balancing the need for
journalistic integrity and national security concerns. Additionally, this
Note will evaluate the advantages and inadequacies of previously
proposed federal shield laws and existing state shield laws.
Part II will establish the current state of the law and the legal
background surrounding federal shield laws, including an overview of
evidentiary privileges and subpoenas, the importance of journalistic
freedom, and the ongoing tension between the freedom of the press
and national security. Part III will analyze the existing case law and
state shield laws, the common arguments made in support and
opposition to a federal shield law, and previously proposed legislation.
18. Karl H. Schmid, Journalist’s Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of United
States Courts of Appeals’ Decisions from 1973 to 1999, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1449 (2002).
19. Id. at 1450.
20. CBS and NBC alone were reportedly served with 121 subpoenas over the course of only
two years, most of which involved reports about anti-war groups. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., In Pursuit of a
Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 245 (1974).
21. Id. at 248.
22. Schmid, supra note 18, at 1450.
23. Infra Part II.
24. Infra Part II.
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Finally, Part IV will provide the justification for a federal shield law
that properly balances the concerns of the freedom of the press and
national security.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Background
1. Privileges and Their Rationale
Privileges exclude relevant and reliable evidence from discovery
or as evidence at trial to protect an interest the government deems
more important than the interest served by admitting the evidence.25
Some privileges stem from the common law and others are statutorily
created. The common law governs a claim of privilege unless the
United States Constitution, a federal statute, or rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court provide otherwise.26 In adopting the current federal
rules of privileges, Congress rejected rules proposed by the Supreme
Court that would have codified specific privileges, including the
identity of a government informer.27 Congress also rejected a proposed
rule that would have prevented federal courts from recognizing any
other privileges unless they were created by Congress.28 Thus, the
federal courts are free to develop the law of privileges.29
Some commonly recognized privileges are attorney-client
privilege, accountant-client privilege, spousal privilege, clergy
communications privilege, and physician-patient privilege. These
privileges are well-rooted in the idea that open communication
between the parties is necessary. It is hard to imagine a world in which
a client is unable to speak freely with his attorney because the attorney
could be called to testify about that information, or where a priest
could be forced to testify about what a churchgoer told him in a
confessional. The most often-cited argument supporting the existence
25. Schmid, supra note 18, at 1448.
26. FED. R. EVID. 501.
27. DAVID P. LEONARD ET AL., EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 585 (Rachel E.
Barkow et al. eds., 4th ed. 2016). Other proposed privileges included an attorney-client privilege
(FED. R. EVID. 503, Proposed Draft 1972), a psychotherapist-patient privilege (FED. R. EVID. 504,
Proposed Draft 1972), a husband-wife privilege (FED. R. EVID. 505, Proposed Draft 1972),
communications to clergymen (FED. R. EVID. 506, Proposed Draft 1972), political votes (FED. R.
EVID. 507, Proposed Draft 1972), trade secrets (FED. R. EVID. 508, Proposed Draft 1972), and
secrets of state and other official information (FED. R. EVID. 509, Proposed Draft 1972).
28. LEONARD ET AL., supra note 27, at 585–86.
29. Id. at 585.
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of these and other privileges is the utilitarian rationale that privileges
promote full and frank communication.30 As a result, some scholars
argue that privileges should be recognized only when it is necessary
to promote communication between particular classes of people.31
Privileges are also justified by the interest of privacy in certain close
relationships for human dignity and a sense of fundamental fairness.32
Thus, privileges exist where the value of promoting confidential
communications has been determined to outweigh the value of the
relevant evidence in a litigation.33 However, the value of privacy has
not been regarded with as much deference as the utilitarian rationale
of required full and frank communication.34
2. Subpoena Procedures
Subpoenas are used to require witnesses to provide information
when they would not voluntarily participate in the litigation otherwise,
or when they would be unwilling or unable to provide the information
without a court order. Federal prosecutors have some restrictions on
their ability to issue a grand jury subpoena, but generally they are
given wide discretion.35 After a prosecutor issues a subpoena, it can
be quashed or modified by the court for a variety of reasons, including
if the subpoena requires the person to provide privileged
information.36 Generally, a refusal to quash a grand jury subpoena is
not immediately appealable.37
If an individual does not appear before the court or provide the
requested information, the individual has disobeyed the subpoena.38 If
the witness appears but refuses to testify, the witness is not in contempt
if the witness has a valid reason not to testify.39 However, if the court
30. Id. at 584.
31. Id. As a result, some evidentiary scholars rejected privileges such as the physician-patient
privilege, rationalizing that patients would disclose their medical conditions regardless of privilege
in order to receive adequate treatment. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. As a result, privileges relying on privacy rather than utilitarian rationale have been met
with various exceptions and even abandoned in some jurisdictions. Id.
35. 1 SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E. SHAW, FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND
PRACTICE § 9:2, at 342–43 (2nd ed. 2006).
36. 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 276 (4th ed.
2007).
37. Id.
38. BRENNER & SHAW, supra note 35, § 10:17, at 383.
39. Id.
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finds that the witness has no valid basis for refusing to comply with
the subpoena, but the witness continues to refuse to testify, the
prosecutor will need to file a motion to compel the witness to
comply.40 The court will then hold a hearing on the motion at which
the witness can explain any reason for refusing to comply with the
subpoena.41 After the hearing, the court may order the witness to
comply with the subpoena, and refusal at that point will mean that the
individual disobeyed the subpoena.42 The subpoena is a court order,
meaning that willfully violating a subpoena may subject the person to
civil or criminal contempt.43 While the government typically initiates
a civil contempt action rather than criminal contempt, the federal rules
do not require federal prosecutors to do so.44
B. Importance of Journalistic Freedom
The First Amendment of the Constitution reads in relevant part,
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press.”45 The amendment was intended to protect the press and
allow the media to serve as a check on the government.46 Particularly,
the Framers were concerned with government censorship of political
opposition and sought to prevent censorship of unpopular viewpoints.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has often noted the importance of the
freedom of the press in a functioning democracy and stated that a free
press is vital to the basic purpose of the First Amendment.47 By
promising a free press, the First Amendment ensures an independent
40. Id.
41. Id. § 10:17, at 384.
42. Id.
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(G) (“The court (other than a magistrate judge) may hold in contempt
a witness who, without adequate excuse, disobeys a subpoena issued by a federal court in that
district. A magistrate judge may hold in contempt a witness who, without adequate excuse, disobeys
a subpoena issued by that magistrate judge as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 636(e).”).
44. BRENNER & SHAW, supra note 35, § 10:17, at 382; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(G)
(explaining that the court may hold a witness in contempt without instructing when civil or criminal
contempt is appropriate).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46. E.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(“In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our national life,
the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and
international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public opinion
which alone can here protect the values of democratic government. For this reason, it is perhaps
here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the First
Amendment. For without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people.”).
47. See, e.g., id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
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means of verifying the official accounts of information given to the
public by the government.48 As a result, the press is often credited with
exposing corruption and government deception to the public.49 In this
way, the press plays a vital role in any democracy by informing the
public and educating the electorate, again providing a check on the
government.50
C. Tension Between the Freedom of the Press and National Security
It is often necessary for the government to maintain secrecy for
national security purposes when advantages of information or
weapons are only effective if they remain a secret from other nations.51
Similarly, it is necessary for the government to maintain secrecy when
information would reveal disadvantages that would pose threats or
cause vulnerability to the nation if it was not kept a secret.52 However,
the concept of secrecy for national security purposes is often in
conflict with the democratic notion of freedom of information.53 As
discussed above, a citizenry informed by the press is a necessary check
on official misconduct and misguided policy.54 While transparency in

48. Honorable Martin L. C. Feldman, U.S. Dist. Judge for the E. Dist. of La., Address at the
Heritage Foundation: Why the First Amendment Is Not Incompatible with National Security
Interests: Maintaining a Constitutional Perspective (Jan. 14, 1987), in WHY THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, 90 HERITAGE
LECTURES 1, 6 (1987) (“Public access to information regarding government practices and policies
is essential to enlightened public debate and informed self-government. That concept is enshrined
in the First Amendment, which ensures that there shall be an independent means of verifying
official accounts of transactions of government.”).
49. The most classic example is the “Watergate” scandal, where the Washington Post was
credited with exposing the burgling of the Democratic National Committee headquarters. See
generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (1994) (outlining
the investigative reporting of the Washington Post journalists and the subsequent Watergate
scandal). Numerous less well-known examples exist. See Aymo Brunetti & Beatrice Weder, A Free
Press Is Bad News for Corruption, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1801, 1806 (Aug. 2003) (examining the
relationship between the freedom of the press and the amount of corruption in various countries);
see also Christopher Starke et al., Free to Expose Corruption: The Impact of Media Freedom,
Internet Access, and Governmental Online Service Delivery on Corruption, 10 INT’L J. COMM.
4702, 4704 (2016) (examining how new forms of journalism and media freedom generally have
increased the likelihood of exposing corrupt officials).
50. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1201 (Rachel
E. Barkow et al. eds., 6th ed. 2019) (“Freedom of the press arguably reflects the important and
unique role of informing the public and thereby checking the government.”).
51. Feldman, supra note 48, at 2–4.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 6.
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government is vital for democracy, citizens generally do not have a
First Amendment right to access government information.55
The proper balance between the concepts of a free press and
national security is heavily debated among scholars and politicians.
Information is often classified under national security rationales which
presume that the public should not possess some information.56 The
Freedom of Information Act exempts properly classified information
from disclosure,57 and Congress has enacted a regulatory scheme
criminalizing the disclosure of information that they believe would be
a threat to national security.58 This regulatory scheme includes the
Espionage Act, which criminalizes the willful disclosure of
“information relating to the national defense” when the person has
“reason to believe” the material “could be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nations.”59 The Act
may encompass journalists who disseminate restricted information
related to the national defense.60
The judiciary has also commented on the balance of national
security with the freedom of the press. In New York Times Co. v.
United States,61 colloquially known as the “Pentagon Papers” case, the
government sought to prevent the New York Times and the Washington
Post from publishing the contents of a classified study on Vietnam
policy.62 The government argued that the First Amendment was not
intended to “make it impossible for the Executive to function or to
protect the security of the United States.”63 The government relied on
55. Robert Bejesky, National Security Information Flow: From Source to Reporter’s
Privilege, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 399, 399 (2012).
56. Id.
57. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (2012).
58. Feldman, supra note 48, at 7–8.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2012).
60. Feldman, supra note 48, at 7. The scope of the Espionage Act is still unclear, but
journalists’ concern with the scope of the Act was reignited when Julian Assange, founder of
WikiLeaks, was charged with violating the Act by seeking and disseminating classified
information. The press drew parallels between Assange’s activities and the activities of journalists:
both had the goal of informing the public about the actions of the government, often information
the government did not want to be exposed. See, e.g., Devin Barrett et al., WikiLeaks Founder
Julian Assange Charged with Violating Espionage Act, WASH. POST, (May 23, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/wikileaks-founder-julian-assange-chargedwith-violating-espionage-act/2019/05/23/42a2c6cc-7d6a-11e9-a5b3-34f3edf1351e_story.html;
see also Infra Part III (including a discussion of whether Julian Assange should be considered a
“journalist”).
61. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
62. Id. at 714.
63. Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
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national security concerns to make this argument and claimed that the
executive branch had the power to “protect the Nation against
publication of information whose disclosure would endanger the
national security.”64 The Court rejected the government’s sweeping
claims but recognized the importance of government secrecy. The
Court did not go so far as to say that the First Amendment would never
permit an injunction against publishing confidential information.65
However, the Court ultimately decided that the government had not
met the heavy burden to prove that it would be improper to
disseminate the information.66
In an often-cited concurring opinion joined by Justice Douglas,
Justice Black argued that the publication of news should never be
prevented, and “[s]uch a holding would make a shambles of the First
Amendment.”67 Relying on the history and language of the First
Amendment, Justice Black wrote that the press must be free to publish
news regardless of the source without censorship or restraint.68
Allowing the executive branch to restrict the freedom of the press by
relying on national security concerns would “wipe out the First
Amendment.”69 Justice Black rejected that national security could
ever be invoked to restrict the public’s liberty under the First
Amendment, even at the risk of exposing military and diplomatic
secrets.70
In stark contrast, in his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart wrote
that on issues of national security, “the frequent need for absolute
secrecy is, of course, self-evident.”71 His rationale was based on the
64. Id.
65. The Court’s per curiam opinion merely stated that the government had not met the heavy
burden established by prior case law. Id. at 714. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated
that the government would be able to restrict publication of classified information if it would
“surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.” Id. at 730
(Stewart, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 714 (per curiam).
67. Id. at 715 (Black, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 717.
69. Id. at 719.
70. Id. (“The word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be
invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding of
military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no
real security for our Republic. The Framers of the First Amendment, fully aware of both the need
to defend a new nation and the abuses of the English and Colonial governments, sought to give this
new society strength and security by providing that freedom of speech, press, religion, and
assembly should not be abridged.”).
71. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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inherent presumption that international diplomacy and effective
national defense often require secrecy.72 The Court’s ultimate ruling
in this case was a result of a careful balance of this concern and the
democratic principle of freedom of the press. The result of the Court’s
ruling and the various concurring opinions is that the press have a
general right to disseminate classified information, but this ability is
restricted when revealing the information would undermine national
security and when the information is not particularly relevant to the
public interest.73
Claims of national security are susceptible to being invoked
improperly by the government as a basis for restriction of freedom of
speech.74 In more than sixty cases, the government has invoked the
“state secrets” privilege to block the release in litigation of material
that would purportedly cause harm to national security if disclosed.75
The government has employed the privilege not just for national
security, but to protect itself from embarrassment or to prevent
exposing government misconduct.76 For example, the Air Force
invoked the privilege in a litigation to keep an accident report
confidential.77 When the report was declassified years later, the
accident report did not reveal any state secrets but instead exposed the
Air Force’s failure to make repairs to the aircraft.78 The danger of
upsetting the balance between national security and freedom of
information changes with advances in technology and with each
change in administration. The current scheme relies heavily on the
courts along with the good faith of the press and the government to
strike this balance.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 714 (per curiam).
74. Feldman, supra note 48, at 12.
75. Government Engaging in Pattern of Cover-Up; Whistleblowers Silenced at the Expense
of Our Safety, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/government-engaging-pattern-coverwhistleblowers-silenced-expense-our-safety (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
76. Id.
77. Barry Siegel, A Daughter Discovers What Really Happened, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2004),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-apr-19-na-b29parttwo19-story.html.
78. Id.
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D. State of the Law
1. Branzburg v. Hayes
The landmark Supreme Court case on journalistic privilege is
Branzburg v. Hayes,79 a five-four decision in which the Court held that
journalists who agree to keep a source confidential do not have a
constitutional testimonial privilege under the First Amendment.80 The
case arose when reporter Paul Branzburg refused to testify before state
grand juries about his confidential sources.81 Branzburg had written
two articles about the drug trade in Louisville, Kentucky, after
observing and interviewing people using drugs.82 The appellants in the
two companion cases, In re Pappas83 and Caldwell v. United States,84
were two reporters covering activity within the Black Panther
organization who were also called to testify before grand juries.85
Ultimately, the Court decided that the First Amendment’s freedom of
speech and press was not abridged by requiring journalists to appear
and testify before state or federal grand juries.86
The journalist-petitioners argued for the creation of a journalistic
privilege. They argued that in order to gather news, it is necessary that
journalists agree to keep their source a secret or agree to publish only
part of the facts revealed.87 If a journalist were forced to reveal this
information to a grand jury, sources would be deterred from revealing
information. The result would be to the detriment of the free flow of
information protected by the First Amendment.88 Notably, the
journalists did not argue for an absolute privilege but asserted they
should be afforded a qualified privilege.89 The privilege would only
allow journalists to refuse to appear or testify if the information was
unavailable from other sources and the need for the information was
“sufficiently compelling to override the claimed invasion of First

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Id. at 708.
Id. at 668–70.
Id. at 667–68.
434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev’d sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), aff’g sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672–79.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 680.
Id.
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Amendment interests” resulting from the disclosure.90 The journalists
argued the burden on news gathering resulting from forcing reporters
to disclose this information outweighed any public interest in
obtaining the information.91
The majority rejected the journalists’ arguments but did recognize
the importance of news gathering, free speech, and press.92 However,
the Court ultimately found that requiring a journalist to reveal their
source would not constitute an intrusion or restriction upon the press.93
Justice White, writing for the majority, wrote that the First
Amendment “does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the
press.”94 Moreover, any burden claimed by the journalists was
“uncertain” and would not threaten the majority of confidential
relationships between journalists and their sources.95 The Court placed
the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting crimes reported to the
press over the public interest in possible future news about crime from
undisclosed sources.96
Although the Court did not grant any testimonial privilege for
journalists, in dicta, the Court commented on the distinction between
an absolute and qualified privilege. The Court reasoned that a
qualified privilege would not be a satisfactory solution to journalists’
fear that sources would be deterred “whenever a judge determines the
situation justifies.”97 Thus, the Court seemed to recognize the potential
faults in schemes of qualified privilege. Although the Court ultimately
decided that any testimonial privileges for journalists should be
granted by a legislature rather than the courts,98 two separate dissents
would have held otherwise.
In the first dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, argued that the Court’s decision would “impair
performance of the press’ constitutionally protected functions” and
90. Id.
91. Id. at 681.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 681–82.
94. Id. at 682.
95. Id. at 690–91.
96. Id. at 695 (“[W]e cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible future
news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over the public
interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus
deterring the commission of such crimes in the future.”).
97. Id. at 702.
98. Id. at 706.
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hamper the administration of justice.99 Justice Stewart argued that the
confidential relationship between a journalist and his source “stems
from the broad societal interest in a full and free flow of information
to the public” vital to a free press.100 Justice Stewart recognized that
confidentiality is essential to the creation and maintenance of a news
gathering relationship with informants.101 He argued that failing to
protect this confidential relationship would deter sources from giving
information and would deter journalists from gathering and publishing
that information.102 As a result of the majority’s decision, a journalist
may be forced to choose between being punished for refusing to testify
or disclosing confidential information in violation of his professional
ethics and impairing his resourcefulness as a journalist in the future.103
Thus, when the journalist and the source cannot rely on
confidentiality, valuable information will not be discovered or be
published, to the detriment of the public.104
While Justice Stewart recognized the importance of a journalist’s
evidentiary privilege, he still argued for a qualified, rather than
absolute privilege. To compel a journalist to reveal his source, Justice
Stewart would have required the government to show probable cause
to believe that the journalist has information “that is clearly relevant
to a specific probable violation of law,” that the information cannot be
sought by other means, and that there is a “compelling and overriding
interest” in the information sought.105
Justice Douglas went a step further, arguing in a separate dissent
that an absolute privilege should protect journalists under the First
Amendment.106 He believed that the First Amendment gave the press
an “absolute and unqualified” privilege, and that the drafters of the
First Amendment had balanced the needs of the government with the
need for an uncensored flow of opinion and reporting.107 Thus, there
99. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 725–26.
101. Id. at 728.
102. Id. at 728 (“[A]n unbridled subpoena power—the absence of a constitutional right
protecting, in any way, a confidential relationship from compulsory process—will either deter
sources from divulging information or deter reporters from gathering and publishing
information.”).
103. Id. at 731–32.
104. Id. at 736.
105. Id. at 743.
106. See id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 712, 715.
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could be no compelling need which qualified a journalist’s immunity
from appearing or testifying before a grand jury.108
Justice Douglas also cautioned that any qualified privilege would
be “twisted and relaxed so as to provide virtually no protection at all”
as the country’s values and politics changed.109 He chastised the
majority for impeding the dissemination of ideas by failing to protect
the free press and forcing a journalist to testify.110 Similar to the
journalist-petitioners, Justice Douglas argued that forcing a journalist
to testify would quell communication between sources and journalists,
and restrain journalists who would fear being forced to reveal their
sources.111 In making this argument, Justice Douglas recognized the
preferred position of journalists in an effective self-government
system because of their crucial duty to bring information to the
public.112 He feared that without an evidentiary privilege, journalists
would become victims of government pressure and their sources
would fear exposure, resulting in journalists’ inability to provide news
beyond that which the government allowed.113 In making this
comment, Justice Douglas noted the importance of the press in
inviting radical ideas and challenging the status quo.114
Given the close decision, the proper interpretation of the
Branzburg decision was unclear and left largely to the lower courts.
Adding to the confusion was Justice Powell’s short concurring
opinion, in which he emphasized that the Court’s holding was
limited.115 Justice Powell believed that the courts should determine
whether a journalist had a privilege against testifying by balancing the
freedom of the press with “the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony with respect to criminal conduct.”116 Justice Stewart

108. Id. at 712.
109. Id. at 720.
110. Id. at 720–21.
111. Id. at 721.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 722 (“If what the Court sanctions today becomes settled law, then the reporter’s main
function in American society will be to pass on to the public the press releases which the various
departments of government issue.”).
114. Id. at 721–22.
115. Id. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 710.
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characterized Justice Powell’s concurrence as “enigmatic,” a
foreshadowing of the confusion to come in the lower courts.117
2. Post-Branzburg Lower Court Decisions
After Branzburg, the Supreme Court refused to hear another case
where a journalist claimed evidentiary privilege against revealing a
confidential source.118 Following the decision, some state and federal
courts have followed the majority and afforded no evidentiary
privilege to journalists while other courts have applied a qualified
privilege as proposed by Justice Stewart’s dissent.119 Following the
case-by-case balancing test posited by Justice Powell, most federal
appellate courts have interpreted Branzburg as recognizing a qualified
First Amendment privilege for journalists.120 In contrast, the Sixth
Circuit followed the majority opinion strictly and decided journalists
do not have a privilege in grand jury proceedings.121 Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit has decided there is no journalistic privilege beyond
requiring that subpoenas are “reasonable in the circumstances.”122
However, federal and state courts have recognized a First
Amendment-based journalist’s privilege in situations factually
different from Branzburg.123 For instance, as the Branzburg ruling
only addressed journalists’ claims of privilege when facing grand jury
subpoenas, the situation has differed when prosecutors and criminal
117. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice Stewart commented further on
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, saying that the opinion left room “for the hope that in some
future case the Court may take a less absolute position.” Id. at 746 n.36.
118. Schmid, supra note 18, at 1453–54. Most appeals are based on the theory that Branzburg
left open the narrow claim for privilege when a journalist is being harassed by the government. Id.
at 1454.
119. Id. at 1453–54.
120. See, e.g., Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. (In re Madden), 151 F.3d 125, 128–
29 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998); Shoen v. Shoen, 5
F.3d 1289, 1292–93 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Long (In re Shain), 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th
Cir. 1992); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181–82 (1st Cir. 1988); Von
Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487,
1504 (11th Cir. 1986).
121. Storer Commc’ns Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 584–86
(6th Cir. 1987) (holding that a television reporter had no First Amendment privilege to withhold
information sought by grand jury).
122. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (“It seems to us that rather than
speaking of privilege, courts should simply make sure that a subpoena . . . is reasonable in the
circumstances, which is the general criterion for judicial review of subpoenas.”); see also U.S.
Dep’t of Educ. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 481 F.3d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 2007) (“There isn’t
even a reporter’s privilege in federal cases.”).
123. Schmid, supra note 18, at 1442.
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defendants have subpoenaed journalists.124 The result is that following
Branzburg, whether or not a journalist has an evidentiary privilege has
depended largely on what court they have found themselves in.
3. Existing State Shield Laws
The Court in Branzburg left open the possibility of state or federal
legislation affording either a qualified or absolute privilege to
journalists.125 At the time Branzburg was decided, only seventeen
states afforded some statutory protection to a journalist’s confidential
sources, each with varying levels of privilege.126 After the Supreme
Court invited federal and state legislatures to provide protections,
more states began to pass state shield laws. As of this writing, fortyeight states and the District of Columbia now afford varying levels of
testimonial privileges to journalists through their state statutes or
constitution, common law recognition based on the First Amendment,
or both.127 However, state protections vary in scope and none can
protect journalists from being compelled to reveal their sources during
a federal investigation.128
Sixteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted shield
laws affording an absolute privilege for journalists protecting their
sources.129 Twenty-four states have enacted shield laws where the
124. Both grand juries and prosecutors seek information from journalists less frequently than
criminal defendants but are often more successful. Grand juries and prosecutors are granted
subpoena power by statute and common law while criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment
right to compel disclosure of information on their behalf. Id. at 1465.
125. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972) (“At the federal level, Congress has
freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable . . . .
There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their
own standards . . . . It goes without saying, of course, that we are powerless to bar state courts from
responding in their own way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize a newsman’s
privilege, either qualified or absolute.”).
126. Id. at 689 n.27.
127. Harris, supra note 6. Wyoming is the only state that has never had a state shield law or a
common law privilege for journalists, and as of this writing, no bill has ever been filed in the state
legislature. What’s up with Wyoming and the Reporter’s Privilege?, NEWS MEDIA & L., Fall 2008,
at 37, 37. Currently, Hawaii does not have a shield law either, as its model shield law had a sunset
provision and expired in 2013. Paul W. Taylor, The Perils of Protecting the Press, GOVERNING,
July 2013, at 16, 16.
128. Harris, supra note 6.
129. Alabama (ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2019)), Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–
09.25.390 (West 2019)), Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2019)), California (CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2009)), District of Columbia (D.C. CODE § 16-4702 (2019)), Indiana
(IND. CODE §§ 34-46-4-1 to 34-46-4-2 (2019)), Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (West
2019)), Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 2019)), Montana (MONT.
CODE. ANN. §§ 26-1-902 to 26-1-903 (2019)), Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 20-147
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privilege is qualified or contains exceptions.130 Eight other states still
have not enacted a shield law, but their state courts have recognized a
privilege for sources that is qualified or contains exceptions.131
Of those states which afford only a qualified privilege, the
protections are widely varied. Some shield laws only protect the
identity of sources, not unpublished or confidential information;
others do the opposite and only protect information and not sources.132
Some states expressly limit the privilege when information is sought
in a libel litigation.133 Some states even protect journalists from third-

(2019)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2019)), New York (N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h
(McKinney 2009)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (West 2019)), Oregon (OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 44.510–44.540 (2019)), Pennsylvania (42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942(a) (2019)),
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1615 (2019)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 5.68.010
(2019)), and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 885.14 (2019)).
130. Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2019)), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90119 (West 2019)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146t (2019)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 4320–26 (2019)), Florida (FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (2019)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 245-508 (2019)), Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901–5/8-909 (2019)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 60-480 to 60-482 (West 2019)), Louisiana (LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451–45:1454, 45:1459
(2019)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 61 (2019)), Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 767.5a, 767A.6 (2019)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (2019)), New Jersey
(N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21, 2A:84A021.1 (West 2019)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-6-7 (West 2019)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (2019)), North Dakota (N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 31-01-06.2 (West 2019)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West
2019)), Rhode Island (9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (West 2019)), South
Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (2019)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208
(2019)), Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.024 (West 2019); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.11–38.111 (West 2019)), Utah (UTAH R. EVID. CODE § 509 (West 2019)), West
Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 57-3-10 (2019), and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 885.14 (2019)).
131. Idaho (Idaho v. Kiss (In re Contempt of Wright), 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho 1985)), Iowa
(Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v. Hawkeye Cmty. Coll., 646 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 2002)),
Massachusetts (In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 574 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 1991); Sinnott v.
Bos. Ret. Bd., 524 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1988)), Mississippi (State v. Hardin, Crim. No. 3558, (Cir.
Ct. Yalobusha Cty., Mar. 23, 1983); Hawkins v. Williams, No. 2900054 (Cir. Cty. Hinds Cty., Mar.
16, 1983)), Missouri (State ex. rel. Classic III, Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D.
1997)), New Hampshire (State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1982); Op. of Justices, 373 A.2d 644
(N.H. 1977)), South Dakota (Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broad. Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780 (S.D.
1995)), and Virginia (Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974); Clemente v. Clemente,
56 Va. Cir. 530 (2001); Philip Morris Cos. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 36 Va. Cir. 1 (1995)).
132. Leslie Siegel, Trampling on the Fourth Estate: The Need for a Federal Reporter Shield
Law Providing Absolute Protection Against Compelled Disclosure of Sources and Information, 67
OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 498 (2006).
133. Georgia (GA CODE ANN. § 24-5-508 (2019)), Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901–5/8909 (2019)), Louisiana (LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451–45:1454, 45:1459 (2019)), Minnesota (MINN.
STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (2019)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510–44.540 (2011)), Rhode
Island (9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (West 2019)), and Tennessee (TENN. CODE
ANN. § 24-1-208 (2019)).
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party subpoenas that could reveal underlying sources.134 Some states
only protect journalists from being held in contempt for failure to
disclose information rather than afford them an actual evidentiary
privilege, which leaves the journalist vulnerable to other discovery
sanctions in a civil litigation.135
When the privilege relies on the courts, the qualified privilege is
often subject to a balancing test which again varies widely from state
to state.136 Among other factors, state courts will consider the
importance of the information to the case, the availability of the
information from other sources, and whether the case is civil or
criminal.137 Then, even if the tests are similar, the results will differ
widely based on the discretion of the presiding judge. These are
merely a few examples of the vast differences that exist among the
protections afforded to journalists in the different states.
Even those state shield laws which facially provide an absolute
privilege have been undermined in some states. For instance, criminal
defendants invoking the Sixth Amendment against a shield law have
prompted courts to balance the privilege against the defendant’s need
for information.138 Similarly, courts have restricted or eliminated
statutory protection when the journalist was an eyewitness or when the
journalist was the defendant of a libel suit.139
The states also vary in who qualifies as a journalist to be afforded
protection in the state. Some states extend the privilege to anyone
involved in the news gathering process, such as editors and
publishers.140 Some states only apply the privilege to full-time media
employees, while others extend the privilege beyond this narrow scope
to student journalists, authors, or online publishers.141 The differences
134. California (CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2009)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52146t (2019)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-902 to 26-1-903 (2019)), and Washington
(WASH. REV. CODE § 5.68.010 (2019)).
135. California (CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2009)) and New York (N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW
§ 79-h (McKinney 2009)).
136. Jonathan Peters, Shield Laws and Journalist’s Privilege: The Basics Every Reporter
Should Know, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.cjr.org/united_states_
project/journalists_privilege_shield_law_primer.php.
137. Id.
138. 1 DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL., TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 8:6 (3d ed. 2019).
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-119(1)(c) (West 2019)), Florida
(FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(1)(a) (2019)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 595.023 (2019)), Oklahoma
(OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506(A)(7) (2019)).
141. Peters, supra note 136.
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among the states as to who qualifies as a journalist is particularly
concerning given the growing use of the internet and new technology
in reporting today, which has given rise to a number of independent
authors untethered to media companies.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Evaluation of the State of the Law
1. Evaluation of Case Law
The case law as it exists is insufficient to provide reassurance to
journalists or their sources that information can be kept confidential.
Depending on which circuit the subpoena is issued in, a journalist may
have no privilege at all, or a qualified privilege based on subjective
standards. Because most federal courts use a balancing test that is left
to the discretion of the judge, there is little to no reassurance for
journalists that they can keep sources confidential. The particularities
of a certain judge can determine whether or not a journalist is forced
to comply with a subpoena, something which the journalist has no
foresight or control over. Some judges may be more inclined than
others to modify or quash a subpoena, and some may be more
sympathetic than others to certain parties. In fact, there is already some
evidence that courts’ decisions based on current privilege case law
depend on the identity of the subpoenaing party.142 Which approach a
court follows post-Branzburg can also be determinative as it directs
the burden of proof required for the subpoenaing party.143
As evidenced by the different outcomes in the lower courts postBranzburg, the Supreme Court left many unanswered questions for
situations factually distinct from Branzburg. For example, it was
unclear whether the burden on the subpoenaing party might be lower
when information is non-confidential, unlike in Branzburg where the
information sought was confidential.144 This provides another layer of
confusion for journalists, as the lower courts must decide the level of

142. Schmid, supra note 18, at 1466 (finding criminal defendants have lower success rates than
grand juries and prosecutors).
143. Id. at 1481–82.
144. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have suggested that the party
subpoenaing confidential information might be required to meet a higher burden of proof than a
party subpoenaing non-confidential information. Id. at 1496–97. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that requests for confidentiality would be irrelevant to the analysis. Id. at 1489.
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privilege to be afforded in factually unique situations. However, as the
Supreme Court has consistently refused to revisit the issue of a
potential journalistic privilege, it is unlikely that the Court will grant
further guidance on any of these issues. It is even less likely that the
Court will reconsider their interpretation of Branzburg to afford an
evidentiary privilege to journalists under a First Amendment rationale.
Thus, legislative action appears to be the most viable option to protect
journalists from being forced to identify their confidential sources.
2. Evaluation of State Shield Laws
The result of the vast differences in state-to-state protections is
that a journalist who publishes an article may be forced to reveal a
source in one state while having a privilege not to do so in another
state. In an age where many articles are published online and
accessible in all areas of the country and even the world, this causes
obvious problems. For example, a reporter working for the Los
Angeles Times would be protected against a subpoena in a California
court under the state’s existing shield law. But suppose the article was
published and made accessible online, including to residents of
Wyoming, a state which has no constitutional, statutory, or common
law recognition of a journalistic privilege. Theoretically, Wyoming
prosecutors could subpoena the Los Angeles Times reporter and
compel him to reveal the identity of his confidential sources or
information. This inconsistency is a result of the current patchwork
scheme of protection that journalists have, and this is merely the
simplest example. The results appear even more nonsensical when one
considers that someone labeled as a journalist under one state’s
definition might not be covered under another state’s narrower
definition of a journalist. Inconsistencies similarly arise when a
subpoena is based on a court-created balancing test which is facially
similar in two states but generates completely different outcomes
based on the tendencies of the state’s courts.
With the increase of media created for a global scale and the
global accessibility of even local publications as a result of
technological advances, journalists need a more reliable basis for
claiming privilege over their confidential sources and information. In
addition to providing journalists with the protection they currently
lack in any federal proceeding, a federal shield law would also provide
some security for journalists against subpoenas from prosecutors in
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other states. A federal shield law would provide the much-needed
consistency the scheme of state shield laws currently lacks.
B. Potential Solutions
1. No Privilege
The main argument against affording journalists any evidentiary
privilege is that there is an overwhelming public interest in secrecy for
national security. Opponents to journalistic privilege argue that the
public interest in dissemination of information is uncertain, while the
public interest in maintaining secrecy to protect against a security
threat is obvious.145 Thus, if a journalist reveals classified information
publicly, the government could discover the source of the classified
information because the journalist has no evidentiary privilege. This
scheme would theoretically prevent the leak of classified information
that could cause a security threat.
In the criminal context, opponents to a federal shield law argue
the privilege would impair a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to access information proving his or her innocence.146 However,
existing privileges have the same effect, and those privileges have
been held to be constitutional even in response to Sixth Amendment
challenges.147 As with any privilege, the argument against granting the
privilege is that the interest in promoting the relationship is less
important than the interest served by admitting the evidence.
Opponents to a journalistic privilege thus must overcome the First
Amendment implications of a journalistic privilege and the necessity
of the free flow of communication between a source and a journalist.
Another argument against journalistic privilege is the uniqueness
of the privilege. Current evidentiary privileges are afforded to preserve
the secrecy of information due to public policy reasons. For example,
the privilege afforded to doctors and patients is intended to allow
patients to provide any and all relevant information to their doctor, the
privilege between spouses is intended to protect the marital
145. Bejesky, supra note 55, at 447.
146. See Welsh S. White, Criminal Law: Evidentiary Privileges and the Defendant’s
Constitutional Right to Introduce Evidence, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377, 377–80 (1989)
(discussing the tension between a criminal defendant’s rights and evidentiary privileges); see also
Schmid, supra note 18, at 1444 (finding the majority of subpoenas issued to journalists originate
from criminal defendants).
147. GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 138, at § 1:60.
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relationship, and the privilege afforded to lawyers and clients is
necessary to provide proper legal representation. In contrast, a
privilege between journalists and confidential sources would protect
anonymity in order to release information publicly.148 Thus, unlike
other privileges, the journalistic privilege is driven at least in part by
the self-interest of the journalist in releasing a story. This leads
opponents of a journalistic privilege to fear that journalists may feel
empowered by possessing a secret source and mistakenly overestimate
the value of the information being publicly released.149
Opponents to journalistic privilege also argue that the privilege
would propagate false news stories. This concern is particularly salient
with the rise of social media and digital news, which rely on
sensationalism to increase readership and generate online advertising
revenue.150 While many of these stories often seem outlandish, studies
have shown that people believe them nonetheless.151 Even more
reliable media companies have been exposed for failing to properly
verify accounts from confidential sources.152 However, the journalism
profession is based on journalists’ own ethical standards, which
require them to assess a source’s credibility and the value of
information.153 Opponents to journalistic privilege argue that denying
an absolute privilege would make journalists even more conscientious
about what information they put out to the public without the
capability to hide behind a claim of privilege.154
Not granting any privilege would also avoid the difficulty in
deciding who qualifies for an evidentiary privilege. Opponents fear
that people would claim to be journalists to invoke the privilege
undeservedly. For example, Julian Assange revealed the misconduct
148. Bejesky, supra note 55, at 443.
149. Id.; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 694 (1972) (commenting on journalists’
self-interest in claiming the importance of maintaining the secrecy of informants).
150. See Elle Hunt, What Is Fake News? How to Spot It and What You Can Do to Stop It,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/dec/18/what-isfake-news-pizzagate.
151. Id. For example, a poll of Trump supporters revealed that 14 percent believed a false news
story that Hillary Clinton was connected to a child sex ring run out of a Washington D.C. pizzeria,
while 32 percent of supporters said they weren’t sure one way or another. Tom Jensen, Trump
Remains Unpopular; Voters Prefer Obama SCOTUS Pick, PUB. POL’Y POLLING (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://www.publicpolicypolling.com/polls/trump-remains-unpopular-voters-prefer-obama-onscotus-pick/.
152. Bejesky, supra note 55, at 438–39.
153. Id. at 445–46.
154. See, e.g., id. at 446–47.
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of government officials on his website, WikiLeaks, in a highly
controversial release of classified information online in 2010. Whether
or not Assange qualified as a journalist was unclear given the
untraditional news outlet.155 Some argued that Assange qualified as a
journalist because he published “truthful information that is of public
interest” while others argued that he was not a journalist, and merely
“dumped” the information in whole without providing any judgment
or curation.156 The situation became increasingly complicated when
WikiLeaks disseminated documents from the Democratic Party during
the 2016 presidential elections.157 This is merely one example of the
problems raised by trying to define the press and journalism in a
federal shield law. With the emergence of bloggers and other internetbased media, opponents of a federal shield law worry that there will
be broad and overreaching claims of privilege.158 As the Supreme
Court has never clarified who qualifies for the freedom afforded to the
press under the First Amendment,159 any federal shield law would
necessarily require Congress to do so.
Lastly, opponents argue that journalists are sufficiently protected
without a federal shield law. The majority in Branzburg noted that the
Attorney General’s set of rules for federal officials in connection with
subpoenaing members of the press to testify may be sufficient to
resolve the disagreement between the press and federal officials.160
Department of Justice guidelines intend to limit the federal
government from subpoenaing journalists in federal proceedings. The
policy encourages striking the “proper balance” among several
interests including protecting national security and safeguarding the

155. Id. at 454–55.
156. David Ignatius, Opinion, Is Julian Assange a Journalist, or Is He Just an Accused Thief?
WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-julian-assange-ajournalist-or-is-he-just-an-accused-thief/2019/04/11/38afac3c-5c9c-11e9-962501d48d50ef75_story.html.
157. Mark Hosenball, WikiLeaks Faces U.S. Probes into 2016 Election Role and CIA Leaks:
Sources, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russiawikileaks/wikileaks-faces-u-s-probes-into-its-2016-election-role-and-cia-leaks-sourcesidUSKBN1E12J2.
158. Bejesky, supra note 55, at 445–47.
159. Ignatius, supra note 156.
160. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 n.41 (1972) (arguing the regulations “may prove
wholly sufficient to resolve the bulk of disagreements and controversies between press and federal
officials”).
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role of the free press.161 The guidelines purport to limit subpoenas to
verifying the published information, require the government to
exhaust all alternative sources of information, and recommend
prosecutors negotiate with the journalist before using their subpoena
authority.162 While the guidelines state that failure to comply with
these requirements may constitute grounds for reprimand or other
disciplinary action, this disciplinary impact is at the discretion of the
Attorney General and does not create any legal right to an individual
who was faced with a subpoena issued in contravention of the
guidelines.163 Although some courts cite failure to follow the
guidelines as a reason for quashing a subpoena,164 others find the
government’s failure to follow the guidelines irrelevant.165
The problem with the existing guidelines is twofold. First, the
guidelines’ instructions to strike the “proper balance” leaves too much
discretion to the government to compel journalists to reveal their
sources. The guidelines provide no enforceable rights and are merely
intended to guide the discretion of prosecutors.166 Thus, it is up to the
prosecutors to strike the balance without any course of legal redress
for the subpoenaed journalist. Second, the guidelines are not a statute
nor established case law, and thus can be changed at the whim of the
current administration. This could result in an increase in protections,
such as when the Department of Justice updated the guidelines in 2015
following a public outcry when it was revealed that the Department of
Justice had secretly seized records from the Associated Press
telephone lines.167 However, this could also result in a significant

161. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(a)(2) (2019) (“In determining whether to seek information from, or
records of, members of the news media, the approach in every instance must be to strike the proper
balance among several vital interests: Protecting national security, ensuring public safety,
promoting effective law enforcement and the fair administration of justice, and safeguarding the
essential role of the free press in fostering government accountability and an open society.”).
162. Id. § 50.10(c)(4)(iii)–(v).
163. Id. § 50.10(i), (j).
164. See, e.g., In re Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa. 1991).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Long (In re Shain), 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1992).
166. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(j) (“This policy is not intended to, and does not, create any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United
States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person.”); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(refusing to decide whether the DOJ guidelines were followed by special counsel because the
guidelines created no enforceable right for appellants).
167. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on the
Justice
Department
Report
of
Revised
Media
Guidelines
(July 12,
2013),
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rollback in protections, as many feared when then-Attorney General
Jeff Sessions announced in 2017 that he would review policies on
media subpoenas as part of the Trump administration’s focus on
government leaks.168
2. Absolute Privilege
The basis of arguments in favor of an absolute privilege are rooted
in the First Amendment, and proponents argue that an absolute
privilege would best fulfill the intent of the Framers by allowing
journalists to serve as a check on the government.169 Proponents argue
that an absolute shield law would encourage whistleblowers to expose
government misconduct and allow journalists to serve as a check on
the government without fearing jail time.170 Proponents also argue that
an absolute privilege would provide judicial efficiency, as courts
would not need to balance claims of privilege on a case-by-case
basis.171 Further, an absolute privilege would promote uniformity of
the law and prevent uncertainty in protection regardless of the court in
which a journalist is subpoenaed.172
Most proponents of an absolute privilege argue that a qualified
privilege is insufficient to adequately protect journalists. Proponents
worry that a qualified privilege based on a balancing test would leave
too much discretion to the courts and perpetuate the current disparity
of protection that exists as a result of the current scheme.173 One
argument against a qualified privilege that is commonly raised by
proponents of an absolute privilege is that a qualified privilege does
not give journalists enough uniformity to rely on. As Justice Douglas
cautioned in his dissent in Branzburg, a qualified evidentiary privilege
can be manipulated by politicians or courts to fit with the politics of
the time or the politician’s particular view of the worth of state
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-eric-holder-justice-department-reportrevised-media-guidelines; see also Gov’t Obtains Wide AP Phone Records in Probe,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 13, 2013), https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2013/govt-obtains-wideap-phone-records-in-probe (explaining the government seizure and the Associated Press’s
response).
168. Josh Gerstein & Madeline Conway, Sessions: DOJ Reviewing Policies on Media
Subpoenas, POLITICO (Aug. 4, 2017, 1:45 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/04/dojreviewing-policies-on-media-subpoenas-sessions-says-241329.
169. Siegel, supra note 132, at 474–75.
170. Id. at 524.
171. E.g., id. at 473.
172. Id. at 521.
173. Id. at 520.
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objectives.174 The majority also believed that a qualified privilege
would not be effective in instilling confidence in sources that their
identities would not be revealed.175
Without an absolute privilege, proponents worry that journalists
will engage in self-censorship, and the public will not receive vital
information uncovering government misconduct.176 Proponents also
argue that having no absolute privilege will lead to the self-censorship
of sources who investigate the current scheme of protection and realize
that their confidentiality is not assured unless the journalist is willing
to go to jail for them.177
3. Qualified Privilege
Although the argument for a qualified evidentiary privilege relies
on many of the same First Amendment freedom of the press arguments
as proponents of an absolute privilege, a qualified privilege provides
a fair balance between the concerns of a free press and national
security. Most previously proposed federal legislation has been federal
shield laws affording journalists with a qualified privilege. A law
providing for a qualified privilege is more likely to gain support than
a law providing for an absolute privilege, which many fear would
improperly impede upon the government’s need for secrecy for
national security purposes. Under a qualified scheme, the government
would still be able to prosecute individuals for criminal acts or acts of
terrorism, or to pursue leakers of information that improperly exposed
state secrets. Most states have opted for a qualified evidentiary
privilege under their respective state protections, and even those states
with absolute privileges have found their privilege undercut by
constitutional concerns.178 Thus, the current scheme evidences more
support and less pushback for a qualified privilege than an absolute
privilege.

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 711 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 702 (majority opinion).
Siegel, supra note 132, at 524.
Id.
Supra Part II.
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C. Evaluation of Previous Legislative Attempts
at Federal Shield Laws
Even at the time Branzburg was decided, federal statutes granting
journalists a testimonial privilege had already been proposed.179 More
recently, a federal shield law titled “The Free Flow of Information
Act” has been regularly introduced in Congress. The Free Flow of
Information Act of 2007 was passed by the House of Representatives
by a significant bipartisan majority of 398–21 but did not pass a
cloture vote in the Senate in 2008,180 in part because of the opposition
by the Department of Justice and the threat of a potential veto by
President George W. Bush, who was concerned about the impact the
legislation would have on terrorism concerns.181 Similarly, the Free
Flow of Information Act of 2009 passed the House and was never
voted on by the Senate.182 The Free Flow of Information Act of 2013
was introduced to the Senate but was not enacted before the Congress
adjourned.183 In 2015, the House passed an amendment to another
House bill to protect journalists, but the provision was removed from
the version that ultimately passed the Senate.184
The most recent hope for a federal shield law was the Free Flow
of Information Act of 2017, a house bill introduced on November 14,
2017, by Representative Jamie Raskin.185 The bill is identical to the
Free Flow of Information Act of 2007186 and was introduced after
179. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689 n.28.
180. S. 2035, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007).
181. Upohar Haroon, Free Flow of Information Act, FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1083/free-flow-of-information-act (last updated
2018). Despite this, the bill had significant support from various major media companies including
the Associated Press, the National Association of Broadcasters, Bloomberg News, CBS,
ClearChannel, CNN, Cox, Gannett, Hearst, NBC, News Corporation, the New York Times, TIME,
and the Washington Post. House Passes the Free Flow of Information Act, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
(Oct. 16, 2007), https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/house-passes-the-free-flow-of-informationact.
182. Federal Shield Law Efforts, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
https://www.rcfp.org/federal-shield-law/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
183. Id.
184. H.R. 2578, 114th Cong., H. Amendment 333 (2015) (“None of the funds made available
by this Act may be used to compel a person to testify about information or sources that the person
states in a motion to quash the subpoena that he has obtained as a journalist or reporter and that he
regards as confidential.”); Josh Gerstein & Seung Min Kim, House Passes Reporter’s Shield
Measure, Again, POLITICO (June 3, 2015, 6:44 PM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-theradar/2015/06/house-passes-reporters-shield-measure-again-208206.
185. Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, H.R. 4382, 115th Cong. (2017).
186. Press Release, Jaime Raskin, U.S. Congressman, 8th Dist. of Md., Reps. Raskin & Jordan
Introduce Bipartisan Federal Press Shield Law (Nov. 14, 2017), https://raskin.house.gov/media/
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then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions would not make a commitment
not to jail journalists.187 The bill’s stated purpose was “[t]o maintain
the free flow of information to the public by providing conditions for
the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain persons
connected with the news media.”188 The bill had twelve cosponsors,
both Democratic and Republican.189 Raskin and supporters argued that
the bill was vital to guarantee First Amendment protections by
allowing journalists to protect confidential sources and be free of the
fear of prosecution or jail time.190 As of December 2017, the bill was
referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland
Security, and Investigations but was stalled until Congress adjourned
on January 3, 2019.191
The bill would have provided journalists a qualified privilege.
Journalists would still be forced to reveal sources or documents related
to their investigation if: (1) the party seeking to compel production
could prove it had exhausted other options for obtaining the
information,192 (2) the information sought was “critical” to the
investigation,193 and (3) “the public interest in compelling disclosure
of the information or document involved outweigh[ed] the public

press-releases/reps-raskin-jordan-introduce-bipartisan-federal-press-shield-law [hereinafter Press
Release of Jaime Raskin].
187.
I don’t know if I can make a blanket commitment to that effect. . . . [W]e have
matters that involve the most serious national security issues that put our
country at risk, and we will utilize the authorities that we have legally and
constitutionally if we have to. We always try to find an alternative way . . . to
directly confronting media persons. But that is not a total blanket protection.
Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th
Cong. (2017) (statement of Hon. Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen. of the United States),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/10/18/2017/oversight-of-the-us-department-of-justice.
188. Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, H.R. 4382, 115th Cong. (2017).
189. Cosponsors were: Jim Jordan (R-OH 4th), Grace Meng (D-NY 6th), Eleanor Holmes
Norton (D-DC), Alex X. Mooney (R-WV 2nd), John Yarmuth (D-KY 3rd), Mark Meadows
(R-NC 11th), Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL 23rd), Scott Taylor (R-VA 2nd), Sheila Jackson
Lee (D-TX 18th), Michael Simpson (R-ID 2nd), and Robert A. Brady (D-PA 1st). H.R.4382—
Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/house-bill/4382/cosponsors?searchResultViewType=expanded&KWICView=false (last
visited Feb. 23, 2020).
190. Press Release of Jaime Raskin, supra note 186. Familiarly, Raskin also commented on the
democratic principle behind the freedom of the press, stating, “When the press is unable to do its
job, the American people—and our ability to function as a democracy—suffer. A free press is the
people’s best friend and the tyrant’s worst enemy.” Id.
191. H.R. 4382—Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, supra note 189.
192. Id. § 2(a)(1).
193. Id. § 2(a)(2).
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interest in gathering or disseminating news or information.”194 The
third of these requirements calls for a balancing test, not unlike that
proposed by Justice Powell in Branzburg. The most obvious problem
with this requirement is that it allows the courts substantial latitude to
interpret the statute. It is entirely possible that certain courts or judges
will consistently rule in favor of the government, making the statute a
hollow symbol of protection for freedom of the press.
The bill also included a caveat for when the disclosure of the
identity of a source is “necessary to prevent, or to identify any
perpetrator of, an act of terrorism against the United States or its allies
or other significant and specified harm to national security with the
objective to prevent such harm,”195 as well as other terrorist-related
exceptions. These exceptions, which were largely uncontested by
congressmembers and which have survived several iterations of the
bill, fairly address concerns that journalists might improperly invoke
the privilege when national security is an obvious concern.
The bill also contained a restrictive definition of “journalist.” A
“covered person” as defined by the Act is:
a person who regularly gathers, prepares, collects,
photographs, records, writes, edits, reports, or publishes
news or information that concerns local, national, or
international events or other matters of public interest for
dissemination to the public for a substantial portion of the
person’s livelihood or for substantial financial gain and
includes a supervisor, employer, parent, subsidiary, or
affiliate of such covered person.196
This description would not encompass the emerging field of so-called
“citizen journalists” and bloggers, which has become increasingly
powerful as technology allows it to quickly reach large audiences.197
Past iterations of the Free Flow of Information Act were stalled by
similarly lengthy and restrictive definitions of a journalist, and state

194. Id. § 2(a)(4).
195. Id. § 2(a)(3)(A).
196. Id. § 4(2).
197. Alan Wehbé, The Free Press and National Security: Renewing the Case for a Federal
Shield Law, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 512, 529–30 (2018); Dell Cameron, A New Media Shield
Law Would Only Shield Corporate Media, VICE (Aug. 22, 2013, 1:14 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bn5g7a/the-new-media-shield-law-only-shields-corporatemedia.
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shield laws also vary widely in how a journalist is defined.198 A
stronger definition would focus on the intent of the individual rather
than on his or her employment or the regularity of his or her reporting.
The definition would also focus on the individual’s ability to analyze
and verify the credibility of his or her sources and the information he
or she is provided. These improvements would address both the
concerns of opponents of the law who fear undeserved protections and
the concerns of those who want to encompass new-style media outlets
deserving of protection.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Consequences of Not Protecting Journalists’ Sources by Statute
The majority in Branzburg noted that “the press has flourished”
without constitutional protection.199 However, the reality does not
reflect that sentiment. As discussed above, the freedom of the press in
the United States has never been assured.200 Continuing to leave
journalists without assurances that they will be protected against
government subpoenas and subjecting them to criminal contempt for
refusing to reveal their sources does not leave the press “flourishing.”
To continue without a federal shield law despite the support for
such a proposal since the ruling on Branzburg would leave journalists
in a state of limbo, relying on state protections, subjective balancing
tests, or the whims of the current administration. As explained above,
opponents of a federal shield law have argued that journalists are
sufficiently protected without a shield law because of Department of
Justice regulations on subpoenaing the media.201 However, proponents
of a federal shield law point out that these regulations are insufficient
because they are not enforced by the courts and because there is little
to no punishment for officials who fail to follow them.202 The
balancing test proposed by the regulations is highly subjective and
could be manipulated based on the Department of Justice’s viewpoint
on these considerations.203

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Wehbé, supra note 197, at 532; Cameron, supra note 197.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689–99 (1972).
Supra Part I.
Supra Part III.
Siegel, supra note 132, at 504.
Id. at 505.
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The inevitable and dangerous result of leaving journalists without
statutory protections against revealing their sources is that the
government will be emboldened to induce disclosure of confidential
sources and information by following through on subpoenas and
sending principled journalists who refuse to give up their sources to
jail. In the hands of the wrong organization, subpoenas can be used to
harass journalists, interfere with their sources, or retaliate against
journalists who are critical of the government. The fallout from these
consequences is that sources will not reveal information in the first
place because they do not have reliable protection against being
identified. Despite the verve of the journalistic profession, sources will
doubtless be deterred by the threat of being identified when the
journalist is subpoenaed. Thus, without a sufficient shield law, the
press will be unable to report about alternative viewpoints or
subversive organizations, the very things the First Amendment was
intended to protect.
B. Impact
A federal shield law of any kind, whether qualified or absolute,
would positively influence journalists and contribute to the freedom
of the press in the United States. A federal shield law would resolve
the inconsistencies resulting from the different interpretations of
Branzburg among the federal courts, as well as provide uniform
protection to journalists instead of forcing them to rely on the
protections of the confusing patchwork of state shield laws. No longer
would journalists and their sources depend on the whims of the
Department of Justice or the discretion of the courts for protection.
Increased protections for journalists will not prevent the
government from protecting national security interests, as the two are
not necessarily at odds. A qualified evidentiary privilege under a
federal shield law can properly strike the balance between national
security and the freedom of the press, both of which are necessary for
a well-functioning democracy. And as technology improves, the
government will find the need to rely on journalists for information
dealing with national security less and less.204
204. Technology makes it easier for the government to get information through other channels
and, in fact, has been cited as the main factor in the increase in leak prosecutions during the Obama
administration. Joel Simon & Alexandra Ellerbeck, The President’s Phantom Threats, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (Winter 2018), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/president-threats-press.php.
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C. Solution
The Supreme Court in Branzburg encouraged Congress to pass a
federal shield law,205 and it is time that Congress act upon that
invitation. Affording journalists a qualified evidentiary privilege is the
best solution. Given the difficulty in passing any legislation,206
legislation with a more moderate approach is the most viable option.
Congress has thus far failed to create a federal shield law that garners
enough bipartisan support to actually become law. However, there is
considerable support for a shield law offering a qualified privilege, as
evidenced by congressional support for the different iterations of the
Free Flow of Information Act,207 the willingness of the courts to find
an evidentiary privilege post-Branzburg,208 and the near nationwide
creation of state shield laws by state legislatures.209
The argument in favor of an evidentiary privilege is also wellgrounded in the rationale supporting existing privileges. The ability to
remain anonymous is necessary to ensure the open communication
between a source and a journalist that is needed for journalists to
disseminate information to the public. The relationship between
journalist and source serves the public interest and should be
recognized, as other privileges, as an interest more important than the
interest in providing the relevant information in a litigation.
1. Proposal
The following is my proposal for a federal shield law, based
largely on the Free Flow of Information Act of 2017 and edited with
language from several state shield laws to properly strike the balance
between national security and the freedom of the press:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Free Flow of Information Act.”
205. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972).
206. An analysis of data beginning with the 93rd Congress through the 115th Congress revealed
only 6 percent of legislation introduced in a congressional session ever became law. In contrast, 80
percent or more of legislation each session was introduced, referred to committee, or reported by
committee but had no further action. Statistic and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
207. Supra Part III.
208. Supra Part II.
209. Supra Part II.
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SEC. 2. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE FROM COVERED
PERSONS.
(a) Conditions For Compelled Disclosure—In any matter arising
under Federal law, a Federal entity may not compel a covered person
to provide testimony or produce any document related to information
obtained or created by such covered person as part of engaging in
journalism unless a court determines by clear and convincing
evidence, after providing notice and an opportunity to be heard to such
covered person—
(1) that the party seeking to compel production of such
testimony or document has exhausted all possible alternative
sources (other than the covered person) of the testimony or
document;
(2) in the case that the testimony or document sought could
reveal the identity of a source of information or include any
information that could reasonably be expected to lead to the
discovery of the identity of such a source, that—
(A) disclosure of the identity of such a source is
necessary to prevent, or to identify any perpetrator of, an act
of terrorism against the United States or its allies or other
significant and specified harm to national security with the
objective to prevent such harm;
(B) (i) disclosure of the identity of such a source is
essential to identify in a criminal investigation or prosecution
a person who without authorization disclosed properly
classified information and who at the time of such disclosure
had authorized access to such information; and (ii) such
unauthorized disclosure has caused or will cause significant
and articulable harm to the national security; and
(3) that compelling disclosure of the information or
document involved is necessary to address harm to national
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security which significantly outweighs the public interest in
gathering or disseminating news or information.
(b) Limitations On Content Of Information—The content of any
testimony or document that is compelled under subsection (a) shall—
(1) not be overbroad, unreasonable, or oppressive and, when
possible, be limited to the purpose of verifying published
information or describing any surrounding circumstances
relevant to the accuracy of such published information; and
(2) be narrowly tailored in subject matter and period of time
covered so as to avoid compelling production of peripheral,
nonessential, or speculative information.
SEC. 3. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE FROM
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS.
(a) Conditions For Compelled Disclosure—With respect to
testimony or any document consisting of any record, information, or
other communication that relates to a business transaction between a
communications service provider and a covered person, section 2 shall
apply to such testimony or document if sought from the
communications service provider in the same manner that such section
applies to any testimony or document sought from a covered person.
(b) Notice And Opportunity Provided To Covered Persons—A
court may compel the testimony or disclosure of a document under
this section only after the party seeking such a document provides the
covered person who is a party to the business transaction described in
subsection (a)—
(1) notice of the subpoena or other compulsory request for
such testimony or disclosure from the communications service
provider not later than the time at which such subpoena or request
is issued to the communications service provider; and
(2) an opportunity to be heard before the court before the
time at which the testimony or disclosure is compelled.
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SEC. 4. APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
(a) Order Subject to Review—If a court determines that a covered
person should be compelled to testify, the court’s determination shall
immediately be subject to review by the court of appeals. The court of
appeals shall make an independent determination of the applicability
of the standards in this subsection to the facts in the record and shall
not accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court’s findings.
(b) Pendency of Appeal—During the pendency of the appeal, the
privilege shall remain in full force and effect.
SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDER—The
term “communications service provider”—
(A) means any person that transmits information of the
customer’s choosing by electronic means; and
(B) includes a telecommunications carrier, an
information service provider, an interactive computer service
provider, and an information content provider (as such terms
are defined in sections 153 and 230 of the Communications
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153, 230)).
(2) COVERED PERSON—The term “covered person”
means a person who gathers, prepares, collects, photographs,
records, writes, edits, reports, or publishes news or information
with the intent of disseminating that news or information to the
public and includes a supervisor, employer, parent, subsidiary, or
affiliate of such covered person. Such term shall not include—
(A) any person who is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power, as such terms are defined in section 101 of
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the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1801);
(B) any organization designated by the Secretary of
State as a foreign terrorist organization in accordance with
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1189);
(C) any person included on the Annex to Executive
Order No. 13224, of September 23, 2001, and any other
person identified under section 1 of that executive order
whose property and interests in property are blocked by that
section;210
(D) any person who is a specially designated terrorist,
as that term is defined in section 595.311 of title 31, Code of
Federal Regulations (or any successor thereto); or
(E) any terrorist organization, as that term is defined in
section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II)).
(3) DOCUMENT—The term “document” means writings,
recordings, and photographs, as those terms are defined by
Federal Rule of Evidence 1001 (28 U.S.C. App.).
(4) FEDERAL ENTITY—The term “federal entity” means
an entity or employee of the judicial or executive branch or an
administrative agency of the Federal Government with the power
to issue a subpoena or issue other compulsory process.
(5) JOURNALISM—The term “journalism” means the
gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping,
or photographing news and information with the intent of
disseminating that news or information to the public.

210. Executive Order 13,224 was issued in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks and has
been regularly updated since. The intent of the order is to disrupt the financial support of terrorist
organizations. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).

(11) 53.3_WENTWORTH (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

ARGUMENT FOR A FEDERAL SHIELD LAW

7/10/2020 12:29 PM

783

2. Explanation of Proposal
The first significant change in this proposed legislation from the
Free Flow of Information Act of 2017 is that it increases the burden of
proof on the government from a “preponderance of the evidence” to
“clear and convincing evidence.” The increased burden of proof gives
the court less discretion and makes it more difficult for a journalist to
be required to reveal the identity of a confidential source or otherwise
confidential information. As several states currently use the clear and
convincing evidence standard in their state shield law provisions,211
this is not an unworkable standard. This proposed legislation also
increases the burden on the government to prove that compelling
disclosure is necessary for national security purposes to place the
presumption against disclosure and prevent the manipulation by the
government that a weaker standard would allow.
This proposed legislation also removes the Free Flow of
Information Act of 2017’s differentiations in standards between civil
and criminal cases, which draw from the differences enshrined in the
Department of Justice guidelines. These standards are rejected
because again they are too subjective and leave too much discretion to
the courts, as they require the courts to interpret what “reasonable
grounds,” “critical to the investigation,” or “critical to the successful
completion of the matter” mean. Again, these standards are too
subjective and are thus vulnerable to manipulation by the government.
This proposed legislation also eliminates several exceptions from
the Free Flow of Information Act of 2017 that are not concerned with
national security but does retain those dealing with national security,
including the terrorism exceptions to the definition of a “covered
person.” While future legislation can address any other potential
reasonable exemptions to a journalist’s privilege against being
compelled to reveal confidential information, the current academic
and political struggle is over national security exemptions to the
privilege. Although other provisions may be controversial, terrorism
exemptions have persisted in several iterations of proposed federal
shield laws.

211. District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4703 (West 2019)), Maryland (MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 2019)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025
(2019)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 2019)), and Tennessee (TENN. CODE
ANN. § 24-1-208 (2019)).

(11) 53.3_WENTWORTH (DO NOT DELETE)

784

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

7/10/2020 12:29 PM

[Vol. 53:745

This proposed legislation also adds a provision similar to that of
several state shield laws,212 which provides for the immediate and
independent review of an order to compel the journalist to testify. This
provision is necessary to ensure that under this qualified scheme, the
necessarily remaining subjective elements of the shield law are not
abused. By providing an immediate check on any orders to compel
testimony, journalists will have yet another protection from being
forced to choose between making unwarranted disclosure and facing
jail time or other sanctions.
Lastly, this proposed legislation also modifies the definition of a
“covered person” and “journalism” in an effort to be more inclusive.
This proposed definition is less focused on the covered person’s status
as regularly employed by a news media organization and encompasses
citizen journalists and online or independent publishers who uphold
the same ethical standards as traditional journalists. Thus, this
definition strikes the balance between those concerned with the overinclusiveness of a federal shield law and those concerned with
providing protections for the emergence of less traditional journalists.
V. CONCLUSION
A federal shield law is many years overdue, and a qualified shield
law is the most realistic means of accomplishing the goal of providing
journalists with necessary protection. Relying on the discretion of the
Department of Justice without any method of redress is simply
insufficient. The Framers intended for the press to serve as a check on
the government, and allowing journalists to promise their confidential
sources that they will remain confidential is necessary for the flow of
information from a source to a journalist, and from the journalist to
the public. The rationale behind a federal shield law is identical to that
of existing privileges: to promote full and frank communication
between parties.
A qualified federal shield law like the one proposed in this Note
would properly strike the balance between the need for journalistic
integrity and the national security concerns of the government. By
212. Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–09.25.390 (2014)), Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/8-901 to 5/8-909 (2019)), Louisiana (LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451–45:1454, 45:1459 (2019)),
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (2019)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7
(West 2019)), Rhode Island (9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (West 2019)), and
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2019)).
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eliminating much of the subjective nature of a qualified privilege, the
proposed legislation would provide much needed uniformity to the
current scheme of privilege, which is a patchwork of widely varied
state protections and inconsistent federal interpretations of Branzburg.
If Congress is committed to ensuring the freedom of the press and
ensuring protections in an increasingly evolving landscape of news
media, a federal shield law is necessary.
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